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Abstract Expertise depends on hours and hours of practice within a field before a
state of proficiency is achieved. Normally, expert skills involve bodily knowledge
associated to the practices of a field. Interactional expertise, i.e. the ability to talk
competently about the field, however, is not causally dependent on bodily
proficiency. Instead, interactional experts are verbally skilled to an extent that
makes them impossible to distinguish from so-called contributory experts, the
experienced practitioners. The concept of interactional expertise defines linguistic
skills as contingent on bodily knowledge. However, recent neuropsychological
findings make it plausible that “first-person”-related neural activations would be
relevant with respect to the subjects' verbal output, at least when subjects address
concepts that refer to tangible objects. Using imitation games, we explore and
expand on the apparently arbitrary relation between bodily experiences and linguistic
skills in midwifery. In alignment with several findings within grounded cognition
studies, the results presented suggest that somehow personal experiences make a
linguistic difference, noticeable to contributory experts.
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Introduction
Recently, Collins et al. (2006) have demonstrated that so-called interactional
expertise developed through linguistic interaction without full-scale practical
immersion in a culture, does in fact exist (Collins 2004; Collins and Evans 2007).
In their ability to “talk the talk” of a field, interactional experts are indistinguishable
from so-called contributory experts, identified by their full-scale practical immersion
in the specialist area. Thus, bodily experiences, i.e. first-person experiences of
relevance to the domain1, seem inconsequential to how one talks about a domain.
Results obtained by the so-called imitation game devised by Collins et al. (2006)
confirm the idea of interactional expertise. Here, a judge (a contributory expert
within a particular field) posed written questions to two (to him unknown)
respondents, one contributory and one interactional. In the “field” of colour vision,
Collins et al. showed that colour-blind people are capable of deceiving judges with
normal-colour vision. Despite their (minor) handicap, colour-blind people are
linguistically immersed in “colour vision language”, spoken by the majority of
people, and they are, therefore, thoroughly acquainted with the language.
Why is this surprising? To fully grasp the bewilderment, consider that colour-
blind people (e.g. dichromats) match any perceived colour with a mixture of only
two spectral lights and therefore, might experience difficulties in distinguishing
classes of items that differ only in colours. For example, they may find it difficult to
distinguish a ripe from an unripe tomato. Some might also confuse the red and
yellow of a traffic light without other clues (e.g. shape or location). Thus, partial
colour-blindness is likely to have, however few and mild, behavioural consequences.
According to the study by Collins et al. (2006), those consequences seem to be non-
verbal altogether.
Neurophysiological results that seem to relate linguistic skills to bodily experiences
intensify the surprise. For instance, when passively reading words with strong olfactory
associations, such as cinnamon or garlic, primary olfactory cortices normally involved
in perceptual processing are recruited (González et al. 2006). Thus, mere reading of
words recruits neuronal areas which are normally correlated to the actual experience
of a smell (for studies on the metaphorical use of action words suggesting that use of
action words in a figurative sense is not effective see Aziz-Zadeh et al. 2006; see also
Raposo et al. 2009 for discussions on semantic context). Neurons activated as a result
of first-person experiences of the referent of a concept (i.e. garlic) are also involved in
neural correlates of the concept without simultaneous presentation of the actual object.
According to Pulvermüller (2005)—given that frequently co-activated neurons
strengthen their mutual connections—specific cortical links develop whenever
experiences (for example the smell of garlic) correlate with specific language
processes (the word “garlic”). (For theories linking words and senso-somatic
processing see Barsalou 2008; Meteyard and Vigliocco 2008; for causal links between
the motor system and the comprehension of language see Glenberg et al. 2009).
Therefore, it seems plausible that “first-person”-related neural activations would
be relevant with respect to the subjects' verbal output, at least when subjects address
1 All interaction with the environment contains elements of bodily based tacit learning of potential interest
to verbal knowledge as we shall return to shortly.
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concepts that refer to tangible objects. Since the phenomenon of expertise is partly
connected to hands-on experiences, the neuropsychological insight seems striking
(Schilhab and Gerlach 2008a, b).
However, if we turn to results from the cognitive sciences, it is worth noticing that
results on verbal characteristics originate from comparatively simple and discrete
tasks, not advanced real-life verbal exchanges (see e.g. Holt and Beilock 2006). The
linguistic complexity of a dialogue, for example, in the imitation game, which
attempt to reproduce everyday dialogues, may conceal irregularities in the use of
language and blur the identity of the contributory expert. This could explain why
colour-blind people, despite differing significantly from people with normal vision in
their colour experiences, passed as interactional experts in the imitation game in
Collins et al. (2006). If imitation games were directed more explicitly at descriptions
of experiences in the first-person sense and elaborated on sensations (presumably
missing in the interactional expert), would their conclusions align with, or differ
from, previous results?
To challenge the non-embodiment idea of interactional expertise and to explore
verbal representations of bodily experiences in conversations, we conducted
imitation games that specifically tap into knowledge of bodily experiences2. The
imitation game method has immediate potential to empirically identify linguistic
differences and frame critical questions of what is meant by language being
embodied. In this paper, we report on imitation games that to some extent, follow the
procedures described in Collins et al. (2006) obtained with female midwives who
either had or had not given birth themselves.
Procedure
The midwife profession targets expecting mothers during the pregnancy, delivery
and the post-pregnancy phases. Besides general health care issues, midwife practices
concern bodily experiences connected to pregnancies and motherhood. Thus, the
community is likely to employ a professional “jargon” concerned with bodily
sensations related to, in this instance, pregnancy, delivery and breastfeeding. This
specialist jargon is shared by all midwives, regardless of their personal experiences
with pregnancy, delivery and breastfeeding.
In the original setup in Collins et al. (2006), a conversation between a judge and
two respondents was categorised as “chance” or “identify”. In the “identify”
condition, one of the respondents is ignorant about the jargon of the target field,
whereas the other respondent is a contributory expert. Here, the judge is able to spot
the deceiver. However, in the chance condition, the respondents are either
contributory or interactional experts and therefore know the target jargon.
In the present paper, the jargon of interest is the jargon of motherhood. The
research question is whether a non-mother midwife (hereafter called the interactional
2 Though theories in cognitive semantics (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980) phenomenology (e.g. Sheets-
Johnstone 1998) and cognitive psychology (e.g. Schwanenflugel 1991) offer fruitful ideas on the
embodiment of language, our focus is slightly different. We are concerned with causal connections
between specific bodily experiences and verbal output in conversation, which Meteyard and Vigliocco
(2008) refer to as the direct engagement hypothesis.
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expert with respect to motherhood) would pass as a mother in questions on
pregnancy, delivery and post-pregnancy matters. Following the terminology of
Collins et al., our experiments belong to the chance condition, since we assume that
both respondents are knowledgeable of the target jargon. If so, judges should be
unable to tell apart the mother midwife from the non-mother midwife.
Method
Experimental condition
The experiment consisted of two phases. In phase one, real-time experiments at the
university involved computer-based conversations between three participants. In
phase two, complete real-time conversations were transcribed and sent to new judges
by mail or email (see Fig. 1). Their judgements were statistically treated in the same
way as judgements obtained in phase one.
Phase one
Seven conversations were conducted in which a mother midwife posed questions to
a non-mother midwife and a mother midwife. Participants were recruited among
employees at public hospitals all over the country. This was done deliberately to
reduce the risk of regional differences to appear as a confounding variable. The
average age of interactional experts was 39.3 years (varying from 29 to 52 years)
and 43.3 years for contributory experts (varying from 29 to 55 years). The average
number of years at practising midwifery varied between 2 and 25 years with an
average of 12 years for interactional experts and between 2 and 23 years with an
average of 10.5 years for contributory experts.
Subjects were seated in three different rooms and kept anonymous at all times.
Judges were explicitly instructed to ask questions that identify bodily sensations of
giving birth, pregnancy and motherhood. To get a first approximation of productive







Experimental Midwife mother Judges between midwife mother and midwife non-mother
Judges between midwife mother and midwife non-motherLay motherControl
Experimental Midwife mother Judges the 11 sessions from phase one
Judges the 11 sessions from phase oneLay motherControl
Fig. 1 The experiment consisted of two phases. In phase one, real-time experiments at the university
involved computer-based conversations between three participants. In phase two, complete real-time
conversations were transcribed and sent to new judges by mail or e-mail
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midwife community in Denmark is fairly small, the judge was told to avoid
questions about identity. Moreover, she was instructed to ask questions that might
help her to distinguish the mother from the non-mother midwife. After each
question, the judge reported her answer—if possible—on a scale from 1 to 4:
1. “I have no idea of who is who”,
2. “I am more in doubt than sure”,
3. “I am more sure than in doubt”,
4. “I am pretty sure of who is who.”
When the judge had either decided who were what, or were incapable of making
judgments, the experiment stopped. The interactional expert (non-mother midwife)
was instructed to pretend to be a mother midwife, while the contributory expert was
told to answer the questions as truthfully as possible. An interview lasted typically
between 45 and 75 min consisting of between six and ten questions. No subject was
informed about the details of her role in the experiment until the debriefing, and all
were paid for their participation.
Control condition
To examine whether midwives actually possess a language of pregnancy and thus a
putative ability to deceive in matters about pregnancies even without personal
experiences, we conducted four additional experiments within the chance condition in
which the judge, now a lay mother, asked questions to a mother and a non-mother
midwife. It is difficult to predict the random answer distributions; therefore, we chose
distribution of answers by lay mothers (a mother who is not a trained midwife). Even if
the category of lay mothers appears to be heterogenic with respect to educational
background and social status, all lay mothers are knowledgeable of motherhood. So, if
judgments by lay mothers do not differ from those of midwives, midwifery does not
improve the judges' ability to distinguish or the non-mother midwives' ability to
deceive. Hence, we could actually use lay mother-conducted conversations to test for
the existence of a professional jargon in midwifery. Lay mothers were recruited
among students and in the local community by advertisement. The average age of
interactional experts was here 46.3 years (varying from 32 to 53 years) and 41.5 years
for contributory experts, varying from 34 to 51 years. The average number of years as
practising midwife varied between 5 and 25 years with an average of 16 years for
interactional experts and between 8 and 18 years with an average of 11.3 years for the
contributory experts.
Phase two
In phase two, the 11 conversations from the experimental and control conditions in
phase one were transcribed into a standard format to eradicate any unintentional
distinguishing marks. The transcripts were mailed to ten mother midwives and ten
lay mothers to counteract any effects of superficial characteristics, such as long
versus short replies, number of answers in the conversations etc. (see Fig. 1). Phase
two judges were recruited all over the country to avoid bias of the results as a
The midwife case: do they “walk the talk”? 5
consequence of regional differences. The transcripts were distributed in random
order from judge to judge to avoid any learning bias across sessions.
Equipment
Conversations were performed using either the free Microsoft messenger system or
the system used in Collins and Evans3 (in print).
Data
The quantitative results presented here are all obtained from the judgments in the
experimental and control conditions in phases one and two. Following Collins et al.
(2006), all answers were computed according to the following rules: level 1–2 were
treated as “uncertain”—even if the answer was correct. Level 3–4 were treated as
“wrong” if false, and “right” if true.
Results
Phase one
To examine whether non-mother midwives can fool mother midwives, we compared
the results from the experimental condition with those from the control condition by
Fisher's exact test (see also Collins et al. 2006). To use the Fisher's exact test, a four-
cell table is constructed. The responses have been dichotomized to “correct” versus
“non-correct”, thereby collapsing other response categories into one category.
Consequently, wrong and uncertain guesses are treated as one category. The test
showed that the distribution of judgments differed significantly between the two
groups (see Fig. 2, p<0.05) indicating that midwives are significantly better to
distinguish between mother midwives and non-mother midwives than lay mothers.
Phase two
Though significant, the number of conversations in phase one is low, which
increases the influence of outlier phenomena. For example, we could be faced with
four extraordinary control conversations which were not representative of how
conversations would normally play out or of the normal outcome of judgments. Both
to compensate for the number of control conversations and to examine whether
midwives were better judges than lay mothers overall, thereby eliminating the
uniqueness effect of individual conversations, in phase two, we compared the
response patterns between midwives and lay mothers considering various restrictions
on data. First, the fact that one lay mother applied the score “uncertain” through all
11 cases raises the question of how to handle such response patterns in the analyses.
Second, the dichotomization of responses to “correct” versus “non-correct”
3 The portal hosted by School of Social Sciences at Cardiff University provides a full suite programme by
imitation games and can be conducted free of charge.
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collapsing alternative response categories, may hide important discrepancies
between the groups. Consequently, a varying number of response categories and
inclusion or exclusion of one specific lay mother will appear in the statistical
analyses below.
To statistically validate the totals from each of the groups, presented in Fig. 3, a
test for homogeneity across individuals within each group is carried out. For each
individual, the responses across 11 cases (i.e. conversations) are assumed to be
independent, and a multinomial distribution applies to the number of certain,
uncertain and wrong judgments. Simple chi-square tests for comparing the ten
multinomial distributions on three response categories results in p<0.01 (df=18, lay
mothers) and p>0.05 (df=18, midwife mothers). One individual (with all responses
uncertain) is contributing much to the significant chi-square for the lay mothers. If
this individual is removed from calculations, the chi-square test for homogeneity is
not significant, with p>0.05. Under the dichotomized regime using only two
response categories, correct vs. non-correct, the chi-squares result in p>0.05 for
both groups.
Comparisons between the two groups, midwife mothers and lay mothers, can
therefore, in case of the dichotomized response regime correct versus non-correct, be
undertaken simply by means of comparing the totals. In case of analysing group
differences using the three-response categories, it is necessary to consider the
inclusion of the individual with all responses scored uncertain.
However, before this step, a statistical analysis of the response patterns seen from












* P < 0.05 (Fisher's exact test)
Fig. 2 In phase 1, in the experimental condition, seven conversations were conducted in which a mother
midwife posed questions to a non-mother midwife and a mother midwife. The control condition consisted
of four conversations in which a lay mother posed questions to a non-mother midwife and a mother
midwife. Wrong and uncertain guesses are treated as one category to be compared with right guesses. The
test showed that the distribution of judgments differed significantly between the two groups (p<0.05)
The midwife case: do they “walk the talk”? 7
mothers creating a response pattern which differs from simple guessing? Implement-
ing a hypothesis of guessing into the individual multinomial distributions4, ordinary
goodness-of-fit chi-squares can be applied to each individual and summed up across
individuals. These tests clearly reject the hypothesis of guessing, both in case of two-
or three-response categories and with or without the specific lay mother using
category uncertain for all responses.
Figure 3 displays the distribution of percent correct judgments for all individuals
in the two groups by means of a simple BOX plot. A reference line 2/9=0.222 is
indicating the level of correct if it was a result of guessing. By visual impression, the
graph indicates systematically higher values in the case of midwife mothers as
compared with lay mothers. This is supported by a non-parametric Wilcoxon test
showing significantly different levels for the two groups.
The summarising analyses between the two groups have been carried out,
considering (1) two-or three-response categories and (2) with inclusion or exclusion
of the lay mother with all responses given as uncertain. The test used is ordinary chi-
squares from contingency tables5. In brief, all tests show that there is a significant
difference between midwife mothers and lay mothers, p<0.05. The interpretation is
that midwife mothers have higher frequencies of correct judgments and fewer wrong
and uncertain responses compared with lay mothers.
Figure 4 displays one set of analyses totals using two-response categories and all
respondents.
When the specific lay mother giving 11 uncertain responses is removed, the 48

























Fig. 3 Here, the Y-axis shows percent correct, and the X-axis depicts lay mothers and midwives,
respectively. The bottom line of the box indicates 25% fractile, while the top line indicates 75% fractile of
correct answers. The vertical bars indicate 10% lowest and 10% highest values. A reference line 2/9=
0.222 is indicating the level of correct if it was a result of guessing
4 This implies hypothesised probabilities 2/9, 2/9 and 5/9 for right, wrong and uncertain response, taking
into account that missing or “no response” occur and counts as a category.
5 Exact evaluated if necessary, i.e. if expected values are very small.
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Discussion
In view of the theory of interactional expertise, imitation games where mother
midwives interview mother midwives and non-mother midwives about pregnancy,
delivery and breastfeeding belong to the chance condition. Both categories of
midwives are genuine practitioners and therefore contributory experts capable of
conversing about the field (Collins et al. 2006). Only personal experiences with
pregnancy, delivery and breastfeeding distinguish mother midwives from non-
mother midwives. If these personal experiences do not add significantly to how one
refers to them as conjectured by the theory of interactional expertise, we would
expect mother midwives and non-mother midwives to express themselves similarly
in these matters. Consequently, we would expect the distribution of judgments by
mother midwives to be equal to those of lay mothers who has knowledge of
motherhood. Both in phase one, in which the judge herself was responsible for the
questions asked, and in phase two in which the judge was exposed to ready-made
material, the distribution of judgments in the experimental and control conditions
differed significantly. When considering the proportion correct for each of the
midwife mothers as compared with each of the lay mothers, midwife mothers were
both greater than in the control condition and greater than chance.
If bodily experiences are of no significance for how one talks about a domain,
mother midwives should be unable to distinguish between mother midwives and
non-mother midwives. The findings presented here suggest that mother midwives
can see through the professional language and identify the mother midwife. Whereas
lay mothers in the control condition apparently were deceived by the linguistic
aptitude of non-mother midwives.




















Lay mothers = 10
Fig. 4 Totals for the two groups in phase 2 summing up the responses across 11 cases in three response
categories “right”, “wrong” and “uncertain” using Fisher's exact test
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A number of possible objections could be raised. First, how can we be sure that
the professional language of midwives resembles a jargon of motherhood of some
kind? If the professional language shared by midwives does not apply to the talk of
pregnancy, delivery and breastfeeding, non-mother midwives could not possibly be
acquainted with the jargon and would subsequently be exposed in a test. However,
even if the overlap between motherhood jargon and the professional jargon of
midwifery is not complete, the control condition seems to suggest that non-mother
midwives are competent motherhood language users, at least enough to deceive lay
mothers. And since lay mothers, more than anyone, are assumed to possess
motherhood language, the fact that non-mother midwives can pass as mother
midwives is intriguing. How come that non-mother midwives can conceal their
identity before lay mothers but not before midwife mothers? Obviously, midwives
are professionals. They meet hundreds of pregnant women a year and witness the
same amounts of deliveries. Due to their profession, it is likely that their register of
pregnancies and deliveries6 is colossal. This optimises the performance of mother
midwives as judges. On the other hand, it also improves the ability of the non-
mother midwife to give reasoned answers (see example of conversation, Fig. 5).
While it seems likely that lay mothers are misled by the professional jargon, then,
mastered by both the mother and non mother midwife, mother midwives grab
features embedded in the answers. The question is what characterises these clues?
One, perhaps trivial, difference between first-person experiences and second-hand
experiences (i.e. observation of another person giving birth) has to do with emotions.
Obviously, there is a world of difference between giving birth and observing
someone giving birth. On the unpleasant side, delivery is painful and distressing, and
on the pleasant side, along with the baby comes an irresistible beginning in the most
radical sense. To most women, the act of delivery is an outstanding experience. The
issue here is not to dispute the uniqueness of such experiences, but to meticulously
examine whether such personal experiences actually add substantially to how one
talks about these experiences. Do non-mother midwives who lack personal
experiences of delivery refer differently to the putative experience to an extent
noticeable in language? Perhaps the emotional taint of the personal memory
unmasks the mother midwife's responses because she is likely to focus on specific
details not readily available to the non-mother midwife and therefore not present in
the vocabulary? This hypothesis is by no means far-fetched, since effects of
emotions on language processing are well-documented (Glenberg et al. 2005). In the
current study, such effects might even come in double. According to Glenberg et al.
(2005), “The full understanding of language about emotional states requires that
those emotional states be simulated, or partially induced, using the same neural and
bodily mechanisms recruited during emotional experiences. That is, language about
emotions is grounded in emotional states of the body, and simulating those states is a
prerequisite for full understanding of the language.”
One objection that makes this interpretation less tenable is the human ability to
empathise with peers. Current theories on mirror neurons suggest that imitation goes
beyond mere copying of physical acts, such as yawning or smiling. We can even
6 Though without further comparison, lay mothers may also know about a number of pregnancies outside
the personal realm and therefore does have a certain amount of motherhood expertise.
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imitate gustatory emotions (Jabbi et al. 2007) and apparently induce feelings that go
with specific facial expressions (Lee et al. 2006). Mirror neurons might even be
involved in processing abstract language (Gallese and Lakoff 2005; Glenberg et al. 2008).
Moreover, the practice of midwifery (at least in Denmark)7 recommends modest
use of invasive treatments such as sectios and rather endorses extensive empathy and
caring on behalf of the practitioners. So, midwifery seems to be a profession that,
among other things, encourages the ability to put one-self in place of the expecting
mother to console and soothe her8 (Schilhab 2007). We do not need theories of
mirror neurons to get arguments of empathy off the ground. The power of
imagination (which might be partly informed also by mirror neurons, of course)
might be all we need to transcend other people's minds. In connection to the current
study, an experienced non-mother midwife reported about a dream she once had
about herself giving birth. The quality of the dream made her momentarily confuse
dream and reality after waking up. Such imaginative powers demonstrate the
existence of extensive abilities to put one-self in the place of others. According to
Selinger (2003), such results can be obtained because of the effectiveness of
extrapolation on behalf of the body (for discussion, see Selinger et al. 2007). See
also Ribeiro (2007) for discussions on the influence of mere watching peers in
relation to interactional expertise.
7 In midwifery this is referred to as the ‘Scandinavian model’.
8 The non-mother midwife referred to the episode during debriefing. However, while playing the role of
interactional expert, she reportedly tried to impersonate a very good friend who happens to be a mother.
A
1. Describe what it physically felt like the moment you 
gave birth? 
A: Fantastic, both mentally and physically, a liberation of 
joy, a state of euphoria. 
2. Describe your physical sensations during the 
different phases of labour? 
A: Different from any other experience, powers that take 
over your body, it was extreme for me, because I had a 
quick delivery, a feeling that you have to give in to these 
forces to avoid panicking or feeling overwhelmed. 
Seriously hard work. A feeling of explosives in your body. 
During delivery,  there is a sensation of indescribable 
tension and stinging in the vaginal area.
3. Describe the sensation of Braxton-Hicks 
contractions 
A: A tight, tense abdomen which at the same time feels 
alive. An intense experience, can be sexually arousing, a 
feeling that the body is functioning.
4. Describe the feeling of a contraction during active 
labour  
A: It feels like a distension, like a hard rubber band 
expanding the pelvis, intense pain, a feeling of being torn 
inside. 
B
1. Describe what it physically felt like the moment you 
gave birth? 
B: I felt an intense sensation of being in the moment but at 
the same time a curiosity to meeting the child and getting 
to know her. My bodily experience was about being 
present, being susceptible to everything going on inside 
me. I think I was lucky my perineum was flexible enough 
that, even though it hurt, it wasn’t intolerable.    
2. Describe your physical sensations during the 
different phases of labour? 
B: During pre labour (the latent phase) I was just slightly 
affected by the pains in my pelvic area during 
contractions. The pains made me feel the need to move 
around slowly. It eased my pain. When I rested, I felt 
locked in a way that seemed to clash with the intention of 
the labour contractions. During the active phase, my need 
for rest unfortunately overruled moving around.   
3. Describe the sensation of Braxton-Hicks 
contractions  
B: A tightening across the front of the body. The 
abdomen/uterus becomes hard and late in pregnancy I felt 
a pang or prick downwards inside towards my vagina. It 
felt like a confirmation that my body was well-functioning. 
4. Describe the feeling of a contraction during active 
labour  
B: It pulls in the area around the cervix and the pain 
radiates to all the surrounding tissue: The vagina; the 
pelvic muscles and the ligaments that hold the pelvis 
together in the front and back. 
Fig. 5 Can you tell the difference? The excerpt is from a conversation that consists of eight questions and
answers between a mother midwife and a non-mother (b) and a mother midwife (a)
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Another issue to consider is to what degree the results are due to abilities of the
mother midwife as a judge and to what degree to her answers given? In other words,
is the effect a result on the part of the judge or the respondent? Do mother midwives
excel in judging because they have particular “inside information” as a result of
sensory–somatic experiences? Or would experiments obtained with non-mother
midwives judging the experimental condition produce the same distribution? Since
we meticulously followed the guidelines of the original imitation game, we did not
use non-mother midwives as judges. In case of non-mother midwives providing
similar distribution of their evaluations, it is the profession of midwifery that seems
to be responsible for the obtained results. If so, we would still be left with the result
that a non-mother midwife cannot pass as a mother in questions on pregnancy,
delivery and post-pregnancy matters. Thus, verbal representations of bodily
experiences are transmitted to the written output and sustain the theory of grounded
cognition even within real-life verbal exchanges.
Concluding remarks
In the theory of interactional expertise, linguistic competence depends on social
immersion. The current study does not substantiate that claim. Rather, it suggests
that somehow personal experiences make a linguistic difference, noticeable to
contributory experts. The current experiments took for granted that the demarcating
level is at the level of interviewing. Perhaps, carefully scrutiny of statements in
which respondents pretend to be mothers as compared with honest statements could
give us a better idea of the underlying dynamics.
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